Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The two-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants. The recent discovery of the powerful class of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents. However, strategies in the prisoner's dilemma game are only two strategies. Are there these results for general multi-strategy games? To address this question, the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games, with any number of strategies. The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games. Zero-determinant strategies in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma can be seen as degenerate case of our results. The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game, the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.
Introduction
Although a game theory is initially emerged as a branch of mathematics, it covers almost every aspect of human interaction, especially including the mutual influence and interaction between human behavior, the interests of competition and cooperation between people, and the most successful applications in economics. One of the most used in game theory is a prisoner's dilemma, it is proposed by Tucker, and the study of the prisoner's dilemma involves mathematics, economics, political science, ethics, psychology, computer science and other fields. The prisoner's dilemma itself is well established as a way to study the emergence of cooperative behavior [1] . Each player is simultaneously offered two options: to cooperate or defect. If both players cooperate, they each receive the same payoff R; if both defect, they each receive a lower payoff P; if one player cooperates and the other defects, the defector receives the largest possible payoff T, and the cooperator the lowest possible payoff S. A dynamic iterated game is one of the newest directions in the studies of the game theory. Under the iterated game framework, the expected payoff of a player is determined by the others. It is difficult that an unilateral participant tries to find a simple optimal strategy. In PNAS, zero-determinant (ZD) strategies discovered by Press and Dyson [2] have attracted considerable attention [3] [4] [5] [6] . They show that a player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents. In particular, a player α who is witting of these strategies can (i) deterministically set her opponent β 's score, independently of his strategy or response, or (ii) enforce an extortionate linear relation between her and his scores [2] . Despite being not consistent with our intuition, it describes a beautiful outlook for the dynamic iterated game and also causes the much attention of many scientists [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Szolnoki and Perc [3] studied the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. To explore the performance of ZD strategies against humans, Hilbe et al. [4] have designed an economic experiment in which participants were matched either with an extortioner or with a generous co-player. They show, although extortioners succeeded against each of their human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity. Stewart and Plotkin [5] explored the evolutionary prospects for ZD strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Hilbe et al. [8] studied zero-determinant alliances in multiplayer social dilemmas. Zero-determinant strategies were also generalized for the iterated public goods game [9] and all symmetric 2x2 games [10] .
As mentioned above, however, these games are two-strategy games. One aim of this paper is to design a framework for zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games. It is found by surprise that the ZD strategies still exist for a player with many strategies in two-player iterated games. In the first place we develop ZD strategies in iterated multi-strategy games and give a feasible condition of ZD strategies. In the second place we study the mechanisms of zero-determinant strategies in symmetric games and the mischief or the extortion of a player. Third, the results are applied to the Snowdrift game, the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.
Framework of zero-determinant strategies
A multi-strategy game has the following two characteristics： (1) Letα and β denote player 1 and player 2, respectively. Both players have only a finite number of strategies. Assuming that there are n strategies for player α ,
) strategies for player β . Strategy sets are respectively represented as follows: The data of a finite two-person game can be summarized by two matrices. Two-person games with finitely many choices, like the one above, are also called matrix games since they can be represented by two matrixes. Usually, these matrices are written as one matrix with two numbers at each position. Therefore, such games are often called 'bimatrix games'. The formal definition is as follows. A bimatrix game is a pair of n ×m matrices (A, B), where 
In iterated games, for playerα the possible outcome of each stage game can be represented
For playerα , the conditional probability that in next game strategy k α occurs given that . Therefore, the conditional probability vector is formed as follows
. (2) For player β the possible outcome of each stage game can be represented as:
For player β , the conditional probability that in next game strategy k β occurs given that . Therefore, the conditional probability matrix is formed as follows
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Because P has a unit eigenvalue, the matrix
is singular, with thus zero determinant. The stationary vector v of the Markov matrix, or any vector proportional to it, satisfies
The adjugate matrix of ' P is as follows
Based on the properties of the adjugate matrix and the stationary probability, every row of ) ' (P Adj is proportional to v. Choosing the last row, we see that the components of v are (up to a sign) the determinants of the nm × nm matrices formed from the first nm-1 columns of ' P , leaving out each one of the nm rows in turn. These determinants are unchanged if the first column of ' P is added into the second column, and third column is added into the first column. The result of these manipulations is a formula for the dot product of an arbitrary nm-vector f with the stationary vector v of the Markov matrix, What is noteworthy about this formula for v · f is that it is a determinant whose second column,
is solely under the control of α ; whose first column,
. (8) is solely under the control of β ; and whose nm-th column is simply f.
We rewrite the payoff matrix playerα as follows vector form
We also rewrite the payoff matrix player β as follows vector form ) , , , , , , , , , , ( 
In the stationary state, their respective expected scores are the where 1 is the vector with all components 1. The denominators are needed because v has not previously been normalized to have its components sum to 1 (as required for a stationary probability vector). Because the scores in Eq. (11) and Eq.(12) depend linearly on their corresponding payoff matrices P , the same is true for any linear combination of scores, giving
where a , b and c are constants.
This equation (13) 
or if β chooses a strategy with
then the determinant vanishes and a linear relation between the two expected scores,
will be imposed. Since matrix ' P is singular, the strategy p which leads to the above linear Eq.
(16) is a multi-strategy zero-determinant strategy of player α . 
α enforces
For values λ > 1 such strategies could be described as enforcing an "unfair", extortionate share of payoffs for α .
Zero-determinant strategies of symmetric games
The definition of symmetric games is as follows：The payoff matrix of player α is
, while the payoff matrix of palyer β is the transpose of A , that is, 
If we assume that
is symmetric. This is also our reason for calling it a symmetric game. For example, the prisoners' dilemma, stag hunt and the game of chicken are symmetric games, which means that they can all be represented in a symmetric 2 2 × payoff matrix (see Eq. (20)
We rewrite the payoff matrix playerα as follows vector form ) , , , 
where 1 ≥ λ is the extortion factor. Solving these equations for the p's gives 
Under the extortionate strategy, althoughα 's score depends on β 's strategy q, the average payoff of α is λ times the average payoff of β .
Conclusions
Press and Dyson have fundamentally changed the viewpoint on the Prisoner's Dilemma. Although their discovery makes us both excited and worried since a selfish person seems to have a more powerful mathematical tool to extort payoffs from those kindhearted and simpleminded people, it has influenced the way we think about the world. The study of zero-determinant strategies enables exciting new perspectives in the study of iterated multi-strategy games. The paper develops a theory for ZD strategies for multi-strategy games, with any number of strategies. We give a feasible condition of ZD strategies in multi-strategy games and a feasible extortion factor of symmetric games. The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games. The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game, the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game. Zero-determinant strategies in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma can be seen as degenerate case of our results.
